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STRICT LIABILITY OR RECKLESSNESS:
UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONFUSION
CREATED BY OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION
2901.21(B)
Felicia I. Phipps*

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 2008, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Colon1 effectively called into question every enumerated criminal offense
listed in the Ohio Revised Code. In Colon I, the Court held that a defendant
may raise a defective indictment which fails to charge a mens rea element of
the offense for the first time on appeal.2 This ruling had a startling and
profound effect on prosecutors across the state as it begged the question—
“What mental state is needed in order to effectively indict a defendant under
any section of the Ohio Revised Code?”
In searching for the answer to this question, county prosecutors’
offices around the state began sifting through every criminal statute
contained in the Ohio Revised Code looking for any actus reus element not
supported by a mens rea element. If a statute failed to specify a culpable
mental state prosecutors were left to determine whether “reckless” should be
added to the indictment or whether the General Assembly intended to
impose strict liability.3
Prosecutors are not the only people to struggle with the default rule
contained in the Ohio Revised Code. Courts have also labored in
determining when strict liability or reckless is required for an accused to be
guilty of certain offenses contained within the Ohio Revised Code.4 This
comment explores Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21(B) which establishes
*
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without which she would be lost. The author would also like to thank the attorneys of the Montgomery
County Prosecutor’s Office for introducing her to this topic and providing her with the mentorship
needed to succeed in the study of law. Lastly, the author would like to thank Mark for his calming
reassurance throughout the final weeks of this article’s publication, which not only inspired her, but
enabled her to persevere. Thank you all for your confidence and support.
1
885 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 2008) [hereinafter Colon I].
2
Id. at 924. On the State’s motion for reconsideration, the Court made the holding fact specific,
thus limiting the holding of Colon I to the specific egregious facts of that case. State v. Colon, 893
N.E.2d 169, 170 (Ohio 2008) [hereinafter Colon II].
3
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West 2006).
4
See, e.g., State v. Lozier, 803 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio 2004).
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a default rule for criminal statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental state.
It argues the language of this statute is particularly vague so as to give little
direction to an individual attempting to interpret the required culpable
mental states of certain criminal offenses. The vagueness of this section
creates inherent inconsistency among prosecutors’ offices attempting to
determine what mental state, if any, should be added to an indictment. This
inconsistency consequently results in a lack of fair notice to Ohio citizens.
Part II of this comment looks at the language and legislative history
of Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21(B). Moreover, it explores the Ohio
Supreme Court’s pre-Colon approach to determining what constitutes a
“plain indication” to impose strict liability. Part II also explores an instance
in which the General Assembly disagreed with the Ohio Supreme Court’s
interpretation that one particular offense required recklessness. Part III of
this comment presents the many statutory interpretation issues presented by
Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21(B). It investigates the problems Colon
I imposes on both prosecutors and courts. Further, Part III seeks to illustrate
the problems Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21(B) brings about by
presenting one especially problematic statute that fails to specify a culpable
mental state. Lastly, Part III assesses the Court’s post-Colon I approach to
interpreting a statute that fails to specify a culpable mental state and
demonstrates that a resolution is still far from realization.
Finally, Part IV of this comment suggests a long-term solution and a
short-term solution to this persistent problem of vagueness. The long-term
solution requires the General Assembly to overhaul the default rule
contained in the Ohio Revised Code by amending the vague terminology
currently embodied in section 2901.21(B). The short-term solution urges
the Ohio judiciary to come to a cohesive opinion regarding the mental states
required for statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental state. It further
requires the judiciary to insert the appropriate mental state into the Ohio
Jury Instructions. In the meantime, county and city prosecutors’ offices
should err on the side of caution by adding “reckless” to the indictments of
any questionable statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental state.
II. BACKGROUND
Since the General Assembly enacted House Bill 511, Ohio courts
have used Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21(B) as a starting point in
interpreting criminal statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental state.5
Naturally, whenever a statute is silent as to a mental state, attorneys fiercely
litigate whether the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability.
This litigation has led to inherent inconsistencies among Ohio courts as they
struggled to determine what the General Assembly meant by a “plain
5

See, e.g., Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 920.
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indication” to impose strict liability.6 This section explores the language of
Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21(B), the legislative history of that
section, and the inconsistent Ohio Supreme Court interpretations of that
section.
A. Statutory Language of Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.21(B)
Section 2901.21(B) of the Ohio Revised Code (“Revised Code”)
provides a default rule for statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental
state. This section states:
When the section defining an offense does not specify any
degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to
impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in
the section, then culpability is not required for a person to
be guilty of the offense. When the section neither specifies
culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict
liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the
offense.7
Taken together, the two provisions of section 2901.21(B) direct a
court to construe strict criminal liability to a statute only when there is a
“plain indication” that the General Assembly intended to impose strict
liability for the conduct.8 If a court looks to the text and legislative history,
and cannot find a “plain indication” by the legislature to impose strict
liability, then strict liability must not be imposed.9 In such situations, the
court must require the prosecution to show, at the least, recklessness10 as to
the conduct proscribed.11
This default rule is problematic because the General Assembly
provided no guidance as to what constitutes a “plain indication” of intent to
impose strict criminal liability on the part of the General Assembly. A short
review of the legislative history surrounding the enactment of section
2901.21(B) provides insight and direction into this issue.

6

See infra Part II.D.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B).
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 920-21.
9
Id.
10
Recklessness is defined as “heedless indifference to the consequences, [by] perversely
disregard[ing] a known risk that [one’s] conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a
certain nature.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C).
11
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 920-21.
7
8
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B. Legislative History of Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.21(B)
In 1974, House Bill 511 became effective and brought section
12
2901.21(B) to life. The General Assembly drafted this bill to “completely
revise[] and recodif[y] the substantive criminal law of Ohio.”13 The overall
purpose of the bill was “to provide a compact yet complete substantive
criminal code, easier to understand and apply, meeting modern needs, and
providing the necessary foundation for effective crime prevention, law
enforcement, and treatment of offenders.”14 This was the first complete
revision of the substantive criminal code in Ohio since 1815.15 Between
1815 and 1972, criminal law had “become cumbersome and somewhat
confusing for both professionals and laymen . . . .”16 The General Assembly
sought to clarify and provide a “fundamental basis for criminal liability,”
and provide sufficient notice to citizens as to what constitutes criminal
behavior.17
Section 2901.21(B) was a significant piece of House Bill 511. The
General Assembly defined sections 2901.21 and 2901.22 as the “keystone of
the proposed criminal code . . . .”18 The General Assembly intended these
two sections to specify the “fundamental distinction between criminal
misconduct on the one hand, and innocent conduct . . . on the other . . . .”19
Moreover, the General Assembly specifically drafted section 2901.21(B) to
provide a uniform rule for when courts should impose strict criminal
liability. Alternatively, the General Assembly envisioned this uniform rule
as a means of determining the “appropriate degree of culpability” where a
court could not readily construe legislative intent for strict liability from the
statute.20 In determining an appropriate default rule, the General Assembly
looked to past case law.
C. Case Law the General Assembly Codified in Ohio Revised Code Section
2901.21(B)
In developing section 2901.21(B), the General Assembly looked at
past case law that interpreted statutes which failed to specify a culpable
mental state.21 The legislature began with the notion that “Ohio generally
12

Am. Sub. H.B. 511, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1972); see also Harry J. Lehman &
Allen E. Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio’s New Criminal Code, 23 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 8, 8-11 (1974) (outlining the history and formal development of House Bill 511).
13
OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, 109TH GEN. ASSEM., BILL ANALYSIS OF AM. SUB. H.B. 511, REG.
SESS., at 1 (1972) (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE: FINAL REPORT OF THE
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY OHIO CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURE 38 (1971).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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follows the rule . . . that unless an act is done with a guilty mind, the mens
rea, it is not criminal.”22 However, the General Assembly noted an
exception to this requirement of mens rea.23 That exception, termed mala
prohibita, is “when an act is declared criminal by statute regardless of the
offender’s state of mind . . . .”24
With this proposition in mind, the General Assembly first looked to
the general rule proscribed in State v. Huffman.25 In Huffman, the Court
noted that Ohio does not recognize common law crimes.26 Because
statutory provisions govern every crime in Ohio, the Court held that when a
“statute defining an offense . . . provides that it must be committed with a
particular intent, then such intent becomes a material element of the offense
. . . .”27 Material elements must be “alleged in the indictment and proved
[at] trial.”28 The Court went on to clarify that if a statute is “silent on the
element of intent . . . it is not necessary to allege and prove an intent to
commit the offense.”29 Simply put, Huffman provided a rigid rule that
allowed a court to apply strict criminal liability whenever the statute was
silent as to a mental state.30
However, in defining a default rule, the General Assembly did not
stop at Huffman. Instead, the legislature recognized that recent decisions
were reluctant to apply the strict rule set forth in Huffman.31 Specifically,
the legislature looked to State v. Weisberg, which held strict liability is only
appropriate when “the statute defining [the] crime clearly reveals a
legislative intent to omit the element of guilty knowledge or purpose . . . .”32
The legislature also mentioned State v. Williams, which interpreted a statute
that failed to specify a culpable mental element.33 In Williams, the Court
held strict liability would only be imposed when the conduct involved “is
such that the public welfare imposes a duty on the offender to ascertain the
fact of violation, and [the offender] fails to do so at his peril.”34
In essence, the General Assembly attempted to codify this case
law.35 The official comments to House Bill 511 admitted that the case law
on the matter was “not entirely clear.” Despite this lack of clarity, however,
22
Id.; see also Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 (1837) (quashing an indictment for harboring a slave and
a fugitive because the indictment failed to aver that the defendant knew of person’s status).
23
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 38.
24
Id.
25
1 N.E.2d 313, 315 (Ohio 1936).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 38.
31
Id.
32
Id. (citing State v. Weisberg, 55 N.E.2d 870, 871 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943)).
33
Id. at 38-39 (citing State v. Williams, 115 N.E.2d 36 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952)).
34
Id. (citing Williams, 115 N.E.2d at 40).
35
Id. at 39.
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section 2901.21(B) was designed to “provide[] a uniform rule [in]
determining whether culpability is required when the statute is silent as to
the offender’s mental state . . . .”36 The rule appeared to be “that, even if the
statute fail[ed] to specify any degree of culpable mental state, strict criminal
liability [would] not be applied unless the statute plainly indicate[d] on its
face that the Legislature intended strict liability.”37 The drafters sought to
codify this rule and specifically noted that strict liability may only be found
where it is “expressly provide[d] for” or where “it can be construed no other
way . . . .”38
Although section 2901.21(B) successfully provided a uniform rule,
the problem of clarity persists. Courts struggle in determining what exactly
constitutes a “plain indication” of legislative intent to impose strict criminal
liability. The Ohio Supreme Court has provided some guidance, albeit
inconsistent as to this issue, but litigation regarding what the General
Assembly clearly intended continues in Ohio courts today.
D. The Ohio Supreme Court’s Approach to Determining Whether a Statute
“Plainly Indicates a Purpose to Impose Strict Criminal Liability”
The Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s comments to House
Bill 511 suggest that the General Assembly intended for section 2901.21(B)
to provide a default rule for statutes which do not indicate a culpable mental
state. However, the default rule proposed and enacted by the General
Assembly is vague because it leaves open for interpretation what language
indicates clear legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability.
The Ohio Supreme Court tackled this exact issue in two cases: State
v. Wac39 and State v. Maxwell.40 State v. Schlosser41 indicated the Ohio
Supreme Court’s willingness to consult legislative history and the
overarching purpose of the statute in determining whether the General
Assembly intended strict liability.42 Conversely, in State v. Moody,43 the
Court expressly rejected this proposition without so much as mentioning the
Court’s decision in Schlosser. As evidenced by State v. Lozier,44 the Court
does not always interpret statutes as the General Assembly originally
intended. After Lozier, the General Assembly promptly amended the statute
at issue after the Court found no legislative intent to impose strict liability.45
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 39.
Id.
Id.
428 N.E.2d 428, 430 (Ohio 1981).
767 N.E.2d 242, 256-57 (Ohio 2002).
681 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ohio 1997).
Id.
819 N.E.2d 268, 269-71 (Ohio 2004).
803 N.E.2d 770, 774-75 (Ohio 2004).
Id. at 774; Act of June 24, 2004, Am. Sub. H.B. 163, 2004 Ohio Laws 4,620.
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These precedents set the stage for subsequent interpretations of statutes that
are silent as to a culpable mental state but provide an inadequate basis for
such a determination.
1. Ohio Supreme Court Precedent – State v. Wac: Example of Clear
Legislative Intent to Impose Strict Criminal Liability on the Face of the
Statute
In Wac, the Court interpreted Revised Code sections 2915.02(A)(1)
and 2915.03(A)(1), both of which failed to specify a culpable mental state.46
Appellant argued that pursuant to section 2901.21(B), recklessness was an
element of both bookmaking and operating a gambling house.47 The Court
disagreed and found that the statute clearly indicated legislative intent to
impose strict liability for the two offenses.48
The Court first looked at Revised Code section 2915.02 which
provides: “(A) No person shall . . . (1) Engage in bookmaking, or knowingly
engage in conduct that facilitates bookmaking. . . .”49 The Court specifically
took into account the fact that the General Assembly included the culpable
mental state of “knowingly” in facilitating bookmaking, but failed to include
a culpable mental state for “bookmaking per se.”50 In holding bookmaking
per se constitutes strict liability, the Court determined the inclusion of a
mental state in one part of a subsection and the exclusion of a mental state in
another part of the subsection “‘plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict
criminal liability . . . .’”51
The Court then interpreted 2915.03(A)(1), operating a gambling
house, which provides in pertinent part: “‘(A) No person, being the owner or
lessee, or having custody, control, or supervision of premises, shall: (1) Use
or occupy such premises for gambling . . . .””52 In determining whether
strict liability was the appropriate standard for division 2915.03(A)(1), the
Court looked to division (A)(2) which provides: “‘[r]ecklessly permit such
premises to be used or occupied for gambling . . . .’”53 Because the General
Assembly provided a culpable mental state in division (2) but not in division
(1), the Court determined the exclusion of a mental state in division (1)
“‘plainly indicate[d] a purpose to impose strict criminal liability.’”54
Thus, in Wac, the Court provided two examples of how to determine
whether the General Assembly clearly intended to impose strict criminal
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
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Wac, 428 N.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02(A)(1).
Wac, 428 N.E.2d at 431.
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B)).
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.03(A)(1)).
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.03(A)(2)) (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B)).
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liability. The first example includes a single subsection which contains two
discrete clauses. The inclusion of a culpable mental state in one of the
discrete clauses and the exclusion of a mental state in the other clause
indicates intent on the part of the General Assembly to impose strict
criminal liability. The second example involves two separate divisions. The
inclusion of a mental state in one division and the exclusion of a mental
state in another division indicates the General Assembly’s intent to impose
strict criminal liability. The Court in Wac further held that a “crime may
have different degrees of mental culpability for different elements.”55
2. Ohio Supreme Court Precedent – State v. Maxwell: Another Example of
Clear Legislative Intent to Impose Strict Criminal Liability on the Face of
the Statute
In Maxwell, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Revised Code section
2907.321(A)(6) “plainly indicate[d] an intention to impose strict liability on
the act of bringing child pornography into the state of Ohio . . . .”56 In
reversing the appellate court’s holding, the Court agreed with the State that
section “2907.321(A)(6) demonstrate[d] the clear intent of the General
Assembly to impose strict liability . . . .”57
In Maxwell, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted section
2907.321(A)(6) which provides: “(A) No person, with knowledge of the
character of the material or performance involved, shall do any of the
following . . . (6) Bring or cause to be brought into this state any obscene
material that has a minor as one of its participants . . . .”58 In doing so, the
Court opined that a court must ask two questions when determining what
level of culpability, if any, a statute requires: “(1) does the section defining
an offense specify any degree of culpability, and (2) does the section plainly
indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability?”59 In order to apply
recklessness pursuant to section 2901.21(B), a court must answer both
questions in the negative.60
The State argued, and the Court agreed, that “the court of appeals
misinterpreted the word ‘section’ in R.C. 2901.21(B) to mean ‘division’ of a
Revised Code section . . . .”61 The Court recognized that the “General
Assembly distinguishes between sections and divisions” within the Revised
Code,62 and cited several instances where the General Assembly used the

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

See Maxwell, 767 N.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 244.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.321(A)(6).
Maxwell, 767 N.E.2d at 245.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted)
Id.
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word “section” and “division.”63 In doing so, it determined that in order to
“supply the mental element of recklessness to R.C. 2907.321(A)(6), [it
must] determine whether the entire section includes a mental element, not
just whether division (A)(6) includes such an element.”64
With this in mind, the Court turned to the Revised Code section at
issue, 2907.321.65 The Court recognized that division (A) of section
2907.321 “includes the element of knowledge.”66 Thus, the State was
required to prove “‘knowledge of the character of the material or
performance involved.’”67 Applying the rationale from Wac, the Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that the knowledge element also pertains
to the act of bringing the obscene material into the state.68 Because
“knowledge is a requirement only for the discrete clause within which it
resides,” the state was not required “to prove that [the defendant] knew that
in downloading files . . . he was also transmitting those files” across state
lines.69
Maxwell expanded on the Court’s decision in Wac by specifically
holding that where a division of one Revised Code section includes a
culpable mental state, section 2901.21(B) cannot supply a standard of
recklessness to any other division within that section. The Court clarified
the difference between sections and divisions within the Revised Code.
Moreover, the Court expressly determined that the inclusion of a mental
state in one division of a section plainly indicates legislative intent to
impose strict criminal liability in the division not containing a culpable
mental state.
3. Ohio Supreme Court Precedent – State v. Schlosser: Example of Clear
Legislative Intent Found in the Legislative History and Purpose of the
Statute at Issue
Courts do not always stop at the statutory text in determining
whether the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability. Some
courts have looked to the legislative history and overall purpose of the
statute at issue. For example, in Schlosser, the Ohio Supreme Court
interpreted Revised Code section 2923.32 division (A)(1) and held that it
“plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability.”70 In so holding, the
63
Id. The Court pointed to specific language within the Revised Code that distinguished between
divisions and sections. The Court cited section 2901.21(A), as an example: “‘Except as provided in
division (B) of this section.’” Id. Thus, the General Assembly used the term “section” to refer to all of
2901.21, but used the term “division” to refer only to part (B) of section 2901.21.
64
Id.
65
Maxwell, 767 N.E.2d at 246.
66
Id.
67
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.321(A)).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Schlosser, 681 N.E.2d at 913.
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Court looked to the statutory text and the legislative history of both the
Federal and Ohio statutes encompassing the Racketeer Influenced and
71
Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”).
Division (A)(1) of the Ohio RICO statute did not include a culpable
mental state.72 In interpreting whether section 2901.21(B)73 should impose
the culpable mental state of recklessness, the Court looked to other divisions
of the statute. In particular, the Court observed division (A)(3) included the
culpable mental state of “knowingly,” but no other divisions of section
2923.32 included a culpable mental state.74
The Court did not stop at the exclusion of a culpable mental state in
division (A)(1). It delved further into the legislative history of Ohio’s RICO
statute. The Court specifically pointed to the statute’s Senate sponsor’s
comments which described the RICO statute as “‘the toughest and most
comprehensive [RICO] Act in the nation . . . .’”75 The Court determined
that the “[o]ffenses under RICO, R.C. 2923.32, are mala prohibita, i.e., the
acts are made unlawful for the good of the public welfare regardless of the
[offender’s] state of mind.”76 For these reasons, the Court found clear
legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability under section
2923.32(A)(1).77
4. Ohio Supreme Court Precedent--State v. Moody: Example of No Clear
Legislative Intent to Impose Strict Liability
Courts do not always find a “plain indication” on the part of the
General Assembly to impose strict liability. Oftentimes a court finds the
exact opposite.78 For example, in Moody, the Court interpreted Revised
Code section 2919.24(A)(1), contributing to the unruliness of a minor.79
Section 2919.24(A)(1) states “‘(A) No person shall . . . (1) Aid, abet, induce,
cause, encourage, or contribute to a child . . . becoming an unruly child . . .
.’”80 The State conceded that this section of the Revised Code did not
specify a culpable mental state but argued that the words “‘[n]o person
71

Id. at 913-14.
Id. at 913.
For clarity and brevity, the author of this comment refers to 2901.21(B) as “section 2901.21(B)”
and not section 2901.21 division (B). The author will use this approach throughout this comment when
referring to any sections and division cited together in the text.
74
Schlosser, 681 N.E.2d at 913.
75
Id. at 914.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., State v. McGee, 680 N.E.2d 975, 975 (Ohio 1997) (holding Ohio Revised Code
Annotated section 2919.22(A) requires the culpable mental state of recklessness); see also State v.
O’Brien, 508 N.E.2d 144, 144 (Ohio 1987) (holding Ohio Revised Code Annotated section
2919.22(B)(3) requires the culpable mental state of recklessness); State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d 144, 145
(Ohio 1980) (holding Ohio Revised Code Annotated section 2919.22(B)(2) requires the culpable mental
state of recklessness).
79
Moody, 819 N.E.2d at 269.
80
Id. at 270 (quoting former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.24(A)(1)).
72
73

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss2/3

2010]

UNTANGLING THE WEB OF CONFUSION

209

shall’” and public policies including the “protection of the health, safety,
and well-being of children,” were evidence of a clear legislative intent to
impose strict liability.81
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the State’s arguments and noted
that “‘[i]t is not enough that the General Assembly in fact intended
imposition of liability without proof of mental culpability. Rather the
General Assembly must plainly indicate that intention in the language of the
statute.’”82 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized “strong public policy
concerns” may support the imposition of strict liability; however, they were
to play no part in determining whether the General Assembly intended to
impose strict liability.83 In holding that recklessness is required by section
2919.24, the Court determined the statutory language was “clear and
unambiguous” and thus dispositive in the case at hand.84 The Ohio Supreme
Court specifically held section 2919.24 “neither specifies a degree of
culpability nor plainly indicates that the General Assembly intended to
impose strict liability,” and thus recklessness is an essential element of the
offense.85
These cases indicate inconsistency in rulings within the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decisions. How can one reconcile Moody with the Court’s
approach in Schlosser? The Schlosser Court specifically consulted outside
legislative materials as well as the statutory language, which admittedly was
both clear and unambiguous. However, the Moody Court expressly rejected
this approach requiring a clear indication on the face of the statute. These
inconsistencies indicate that even the Ohio Supreme Court is ill-equipped to
evaluate whether a statute “plainly indicates a [legislative intent] to impose
strict criminal liability” and requires reevaluation into the vagueness of
section 2901.21(B).86
5. Ohio Supreme Court Precedent – State v. Lozier: Example of
Disagreement Between the Ohio Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Intent
and the General Assembly’s Interpretation of that Intent
The Ohio Supreme Court does not always interpret statutes as the
legislature originally intended. For example, in Lozier the Court interpreted
a felony enhancement provision at Revised Code section 2925.03(C)(5)(b).87
Section 2925.03(C)(5)(b), pursuant to section 2925.03(A), elevates
trafficking in LSD to a fourth degree felony when the LSD is sold or offered
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
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Id. (quoting State v. Collins, 773 N.E.2d 1118, 1123-24 (Ohio 2000)).
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Id. at 271.
Moody, 819 N.E.2d at 271.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B).
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in the “vicinity of a school.”88 The direct issue presented to the Court in
Lozier was whether 2925.03(C)(5)(b) requires recklessness as to whether the
defendant knew he was within the vicinity of a school or only provides for
strict criminal liability, regardless of the defendant’s state of mind as to the
location of the drug sale.89
In holding that 2925.03(C)(5)(b) requires recklessness, the Court
focused on two factors. First, the Court noted that section 2925.03(A), with
which the defendant was charged, required a mental state of “knowingly.”90
The Court then applied the rationale of Wac, and determined that the
language at issue in 2925.02(C)(5)(b), like the language interpreted in Wac,
included a pair of discrete clauses separated by “or.”91 Specifically, the
language of 2925.03(C)(5)(b) applies to trafficking in LSD either “in the
vicinity of a school or in the vicinity of a juvenile . . . .”92 The Court then
looked to the chapter’s definitional section to define the two alternative
provisions.93 In doing so, the Court noted that the General Assembly
defined the two provisions separately within the definitional section.94 The
second term, “in the vicinity of a juvenile” is defined by 2925.01(BB) and
includes the language “‘regardless of whether the offender knows . . . .’”95
Conversely, the term “in the vicinity of a school” did not contain the
same “strict liability language” as defined by the “vicinity of a juvenile”
provision.96 In construing the language the Court noted that the “regardless
of whether the offender knows” language “perfectly illustrates what
[section] 2901.21(B) calls a ‘purpose to impose strict liability.’”97
Second, the Court determined “that the differing degrees of mental
culpability for offenses committed near a school as opposed to near a
juvenile are consistent with a coherent legislative policy.”98 The Court then
determined that the mental state of knowingly did not apply to trafficking in
the vicinity of a school; moreover, the fact that the General Assembly chose
not to use the same “strict liability language” as it did in the vicinity of a
juvenile definition showed there was no clear intent to impose strict criminal
88

Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 771.
Id.
91
Id. at 773.
92
Id.
93
Lozier, 803 N.E.2d at 773. In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor rejected the Court’s use of
the definitional section to interpret legislative intent pursuant to section 2901.21(B). Id. at 776
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that 2901.21(B) applies only to “the section that defines the
offense,” not a different section containing definitions).
94
Id. at 773.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 773-74.
98
Id. at 774. The Court noted that children who were within one hundred feet or within view of a
drug transaction presented more potential physical and psychological damage to the child, while the
1,000 feet vicinity for the school provision did not present such danger and could be applied to instances
where no child was actually present. Id.
89
90
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liability.99 Because the statute was silent as to a mental state, and did not
contain a clear intent to impose strict criminal liability, the Court determined
section 2901.21(B) applied to supply the mental state of recklessness.100
The General Assembly quickly reacted to the Court’s flawed
interpretation of their legislative intent regarding these two provisions.101
The General Assembly amended the definitional section to include the
“regardless of whether the offender knows” language—the exact language
the Court noted perfectly illustrated a “‘purpose to impose strict
liability.’”102 Thus, the Court’s interpretation of recklessness into the
definitional section provided in section 2925.01(P) incorrectly interpreted
the General Assembly’s intent as to the mental element. This illustrates that
even the Ohio Supreme Court, let alone attorneys or average citizens, cannot
always correctly interpret whether or not the General Assembly intended to
impose strict liability.
III. ISSUES
The inherently vague language of section 2901.21(B) is a virtual
breeding ground for litigation and inconsistency. Litigation is an apparent
necessity that arises from section 2901.21(B) because it requires courts to
decide whether the General Assembly clearly intended to impose strict
liability. After Colon I, prosecutors were required to reevaluate what mental
element was necessary to effectively indict a defendant for any crime
contained in the Revised Code. Inevitably, prosecutors from county to
county began to disagree on certain criminal statutes which failed to specify
a culpable mental state.
This disagreement may lead to inconsistencies when charging
offenses because one county may view the statute as requiring recklessness
and another may view it as strict liability. Moreover, county prosecutors
must expend a considerable amount of resources attempting to determine
what the culpable mental state for a given statute is – resources that may be
better used elsewhere. The inconsistencies in charging necessarily lead to a
lack of notice to average citizens of what conduct constitutes criminal
behavior. The decision in Colon I illustrates the inevitable problems that
arise from section 2901.21(B).
A. State v. Colon – Ramifications of Not Having a Concrete Default Rule
The ramifications of the vague default rule contained in the Revised
Code reared its head in Colon I. In Colon I, the Court addressed whether a
99
100
101
102
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defendant waived a defective indictment that failed to specify a culpable
mental state of the crime when the defendant did not initially raise the issue
at trial.103 In Colon I, the offense of robbery codified at Revised Code
section 2911.02(A)(2) was at issue.104 Prosecutors used the Revised Code
language for the offense of robbery to indict the defendant.105
The
indictment read: “‘[I]n attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined
in Section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the
attempt or offense upon [the victim, the defendant did] inflict, attempt to
inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on [the victim].’”106 The
defendant was convicted of robbery and subsequently appealed and argued
that his “‘state constitutional right to a grand jury indictment and state and
federal constitutional rights to due process were violated’ [because] . . . [t]he
indictment did not expressly charge the mens rea element of the crime of
robbery.”107
Because the robbery statute failed to specify a mental element for
the actus reus element of “‘[i]nflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict
physical harm on another,’” the prosecution did not dispute that the
indictment was defective.108 The Court then began the task of determining
what mental element was needed for robbery pursuant to 2911.02(A)(2) and
noted that the statute did not “expressly state the degree of culpability
required for subsection (2) . . . .”109 Thus, the Court began its analysis with
the Revised Code’s default rule—section 2901.21(B).110
The Court’s statutory interpretation on this issue was brief to say the
least. The Court merely stated that the robbery statute did not “specify a
particular degree of culpability for the act of ‘[i]nflict[ing], attempt[ing] to
inflict, or threaten[ing] to inflict physical harm,’ nor [did] the statute plainly
indicate that strict liability [was] the mental standard.”111 The Court did not
discuss why there was no “plain indication” on the part of the General
Assembly to impose strict liability.112 Instead, the Court simply held that
103

Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 919.
Id.
105
Id. at 920.
106
Id. at 919.
107
Id. at 920.
108
Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.02(A)(2)). It is curious to say the least that the
prosecution stipulated to the defect in the indictment. Scholars have noted that Revised Code section
2901.21(B) has a “nonpervasive culpability requirement.” See Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens
Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399, 423 (2000). This
means that the Revised Code does not require that every material element be supported by a culpable
mental state. Id. at 411. Thus, the prosecution could have argued that the mental state was provided by
the theft offense defined in Revised Code section 2913.01 (i.e. knowingly) and that no further mens rea
element was needed for “inflicts, attempts to inflict, or threatens to inflict physical harm on another.”
109
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 920 (emphasis omitted).
110
Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (“When the section neither specifies culpability nor
plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the
offense.”).
111
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 921.
112
Id.
104
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the prosecution was “required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant recklessly inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict
physical harm.”113
The court went on to determine that the defendant had not waived
the defect in the indictment because failure to specify the culpable mental
state of an offense is “structural error” and may properly be brought up for
the first time on appeal.114 In so holding, the court found support in the
Ohio Constitution, which provides that “‘no person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or
indictment of a grand jury.’”115 The court held that an indictment that does
not charge a mental element, an “essential element[] of the offense,” does
not “properly inform[] [the defendant] of the charge so that he [can] put
forth [a] defense.”116 Therefore, an indictment that does not charge a mens
rea for the offense is unconstitutional and, as such, constitutes structural
error that may be challenged for the first time on appeal.117
This ruling evidences a new problem regarding the vague language
of section 2901.21(B). An indictment that charges an offense in the exact
language of the Revised Code may be held defective where the statute itself
fails to specify a culpable mental state. If a court then determines that
“recklessness” is the appropriate mental state pursuant to section
2901.21(B), the defendant may challenge this defect for the first time on
appeal.118 This places the state in the precarious situation of having a
conviction overturned for a defect in the indictment, even though the
indictment charges the exact language of the offense embodied in the
Revised Code.

113

Id.
Id. Structural error “‘involves the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” State v. Fischer, 789
N.E.2d 222, 228 (Ohio 2003) (citing State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904, 929-30 (Ohio 2001)). Such an error
must “affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply [being] an error in the
trial process itself.” State v. Perry, 802 N.E.2d 643, 647 (Ohio 2004) (quoting Fischer, 789 N.E.2d at
226 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991))). An error that is “structural” in
nature “mandates a finding of ‘per se prejudice.’” Fischer, 789 N.E.2d at 225.
115
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 921 (quoting OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10).
116
Id. at 923.
117
Id.
118
See Colon II, 893 N.E.2d at 170. On motion for reconsideration, the Court noted that the ruling in
Colon I applies only “prospectively” and applies only to the cases pending on the date Colon I was
announced. Id. Moreover, the Court limited its holding regarding structural error to the “unique” facts
of Colon I. Id. at 170-71. The Court pointed to other factors of the defendant’s case that affected his
constitutional rights including: the defective indictment; the lack of notice to the defendant that
recklessness was an element of the offense; the failure of the state to argue recklessness at trial; the
failure of the trial judge to include the element of recklessness when instructing the jury as to the
elements of the offense; and the prosecutor’s treatment of the offense as if it were strict liability during
the closing argument. Id. at 171.
114
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B. Problems Caused by Colon I and the Vague Language of Ohio Revised
Code Section 2901.21(B)
The foregoing material presents several obvious problems. First,
how is a prosecutor to know what the correct mental element is without first
litigating the vague issue of what “plainly indicates a purpose to impose
119
Perhaps more troubling, how is an average
strict criminal liability”?
citizen of the state of Ohio to determine what the essential elements of an
offense are, so as to avoid conduct that is potentially criminal in nature?
Secondly, the ruling in Colon I forces county prosecutors to
speculate as to what statutes require recklessness and place such a
requirement in the indictment for fear of having a conviction overturned.
The fear of a court overturning a conviction, and the county prosecutors’
quick response to Colon I, will undoubtedly lead to inconsistency in
charging between counties across the state. If each county does not take the
time to collaborate and come to an agreement regarding what mental states
are required for statutes that currently fail to specify a culpable mental state,
they will inevitably disagree. The result will be one county unwittingly
charging recklessness to commit an offense, with another county, equally
unaware of the other, charging strict liability to commit the same offense.
The possibility of inconsistency in charging only furthers the lack of fair
notice to citizens of what conduct is criminal and what conduct is
innocent.120
Moreover, section 2901.21(B) requires prosecutors’ offices to spend
a considerable amount of energy and resources determining or litigating
legislative intent as to statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental state.
County prosecutors could use such funding elsewhere to combat clearly
criminal acts or help victims of violent crimes, via support groups or
counseling sessions.121
Lastly, the default rule in section 2901.21(B) does not effectuate the
original purpose intended by the General Assembly.122 While it may
119

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is a basic principle of due process that
an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). One problem a vague statute presents is that it “may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning,” in that a vague law disallows a citizen “to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct . . . .” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution requires that a
law provide a “person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly.” Id.
121
See, e.g., Montgomery County Prosecutor, Victim Witness Division, http://www.mcohio.org/
Prosecutor/Divisions/VictimWitness/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
122
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 38. The General Assembly intended section
2901.21(B) to provide “a uniform rule for imposing strict liability, or for establishing an appropriate
degree of culpability where legislative intent to impose strict liability is not readily apparent.” Id.
Moreover, the overall goal of revising the Ohio’s criminal code was to “provide a compact yet complete
substantive criminal code, easier to understand and apply, meeting modern needs, and providing the
120
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provide a uniform rule, the manner in which the Ohio courts have
interpreted the rule shows that the only consistency the statute provides is
consistent confusion with respect to what mental state a statute requires.123
Moreover, it allows courts to apply strict liability—an aberration in criminal
law, originally to be used only for regulatory offenses—in instances which it
arguably was not intended to apply.124
C. Receiving Stolen Property – An Illustration of the Perpetual Problems
Caused by Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.21(B)
In some situations, the statute will obviously define what level of
culpability will suffice to commit the crime. These statutes fall into one of
two categories. The first category includes statutes that clearly specify what
mental element is required to commit the crime.125 The second category
includes statutes that do not specify a culpable mental state but have already
undergone the arduous task of statutory interpretation pursuant to section
2901.21(B).126 However, not all statutes within the Revised Code fit neatly
into one of these two categories.127 It is these statutes which are the current
cause for concern because they do not specify a culpable mental state and
have not yet established precedent as to an appropriate mental state. For
instance, the crime receiving stolen property fails to specify a culpable
mental state.128 Thus, the same questions begin to surface—whether the
legislature clearly intended to impose strict liability and whether
recklessness should be added to the indictment in order to escape the same
fate handed down in Colon I.
An individual could read the receiving stolen property statute in one
of two ways. Section 2913.51(A) states “[n]o person shall receive, retain, or
dispose of property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to
necessary foundation for effective crime prevention, law enforcement, and treatment of offenders.” Id. at
1.
123
Id.; see also supra Part II.D.1-5 (illustrating inconsistencies in Ohio Supreme Court
interpretations and application of Revised Code section 2901.21(B)).
124
See, e.g., Maxwell, 767 N.E.2d at 244; Wac, 428 N.E.2d at 431 (both imposing strict liability for
conviction of the offense in question); see also State v. Wilcox, 827 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
125
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01(A)-(E), 2903.11(A), 2905.11(A) (all defining a
mental element in the statute).
126
See, e.g., McGee, 680 N.E.2d at 975 (holding recklessness is an essential element of endangering
children pursuant to Revised Code section 2919.22(A)); Adams, 404 N.E.2d at 145 (holding recklessness
is an essential element of the crime of endangering children as defined under Revised Code section
2919.22(B)(2)); State v. Parrish, 465 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Ohio 1984) (holding prostitution is not a strict
liability offense, thus recklessness is sufficient culpability).
127
Some “problematic statutes” include: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.51(A) (receiving stolen
property); 2903.15 (permitting child abuse); 2903.341(B) (patient endangerment); 2907.24(A) (soliciting
after a positive HIV test); 2911.01(A)(3) (aggravated robbery); 2911.02(A)(3) (robbery); 2911.11(A)(1)
(aggravated burglary); 2919.23(B) (interference with custody); 2919.231 (interfering with action to issue
or modify support order); 2919.24(A)(1)-(3) (contributing to unruliness or delinquency of a child);
2923.162(A)(1)-(3) (discharge firearm on or near prohibited premises); 2927.27(A)-(B) (illegal bail bond
agent practices).
128
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.51(A) (receiving stolen property).
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believe that the property has been obtained through commission of a theft
offense.”129 Although the statute specifically lists the mental element of
“knowing or having reasonable cause to believe,” it is most naturally read to
apply only to whether the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to
believe that the property was stolen.130 The issue thus becomes what mental
state, if any, must the State show for the actions of “receiv[ing], retain[ing],
or dispos[ing] of property . . . .”131
There are two plausible interpretations. A court or an attorney
would most likely begin their analysis with section 2901.21(B), because the
statute fails to specify a mental state as to the “receive, retain, or dispose of
property” language.132 Once consulting section 2901.21(B), one could argue
that the “no person shall” language clearly illustrates the intent on the part of
the General Assembly to impose strict criminal liability.133 However, there
is equal authority that one should at the very least prove the culpable mental
state of recklessness as to the receiving, retaining, or disposing of the
property because the phrase “no person shall” does not clearly indicate
legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability.134
These two arguments show the substantial likelihood for charging
inconsistencies and a lack of fair notice, both of which come hand-in-hand
with the vague language of section 2901.21(B). Add to this the possibility
of having a conviction overturned for failing to specify the culpable mental
state of recklessly for receiving, retaining, or disposing of property and one
gets a very real sense of the practical problems caused by the Revised
Code’s default rule.
D. State v. Lester – A year after Colon I and Colon II but Still No Closer to
a Solution
Over a year after the Court decided Colon I and Colon II, the
problems described above manifested themselves in State v. Lester.135 After
129
130

Id.
See, e.g., State v. Purcell, No. 94APA02-234, 1994 WL 485578, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 6,

1994).
131

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.51(A).
See id. § 2901.21(B); see also Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 920 (consulting the Revised Code default
rule where the statute failed to specify the required mens rea for a particular section of the statute).
Although, one could argue there is no need to consult the default rule in this situation because the
receiving stolen property statute lists a culpable mental state for the offense and Ohio’s default rule is
nonpervasive. See Binder, supra note 108, at 411, 423.
133
See, e.g., City of Brecksville v. Marchetti, Nos. 67719, 67722, 1995 WL 693091, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 22, 1995) (“It is well-established that when a statute reads, ‘No person shall . . .,’ absent any
reference to the requisite mental state, the statute is clearly indicative of a legislative intent to impose
strict liability.”).
134
See Moody, 819 N.E.2d at 270 (holding the “no person shall” language does not clearly indicate
the General Assembly’s intention to impose strict criminal liability and that such an intention must be
stated in the language of the statute only). But see Schlosser, 681 N.E.2d at 913 (using legislative history
and the purpose of the statute to determine the General Assembly’s intent).
135
916 N.E.2d 1038, 1039 (Ohio 2009).
132
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Colon I, prosecutors and defendants charged with aggravated robbery under
Revised Code section 2911.01(A)(1) disagreed as to whether the element of
brandishing, displaying, using, or indicating possession of a deadly weapon
required a mens rea of recklessness.136 Again, prosecutors charged the
defendant in the precise language of the statute, which stated:
(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense,
as defined in section
2913.01 . . . or in fleeing
immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the
following: (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the
offender’s person or under the offender’s control and
either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the
offender possesses it, or use it . . . .137
The Court held that this language plainly indicated the General
Assembly’s intent to impose strict liability for “the element of displaying,
brandishing, indicating possession of, or using a deadly weapon.”138 The
Court’s rationale centered around its previous interpretation, in State v.
Wharf,139 of former Revised Code section 2911.02(A)(1),140 which specified
the offense of robbery. In Wharf, the Court held that “the deadly weapon
element of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1) [did] . . . not require the mens rea of
recklessness.”141 The Wharf Court reasoned that the General Assembly
“employ[ed] language making mere possession or control of a deadly
weapon, as opposed to actual use or intent to use, a violation,” which made
it clear it intended the offense to be strict liability.142
In Lester, the Court followed Wharf’s rationale to a tee and
disregarded the statute’s obvious similarities to the robbery statute at issue
in Colon I.143 Thus, over a year after Colon I and Colon II, the Court has yet
to set a clear and consistent method of determining when the General
Assembly clearly indicated a purpose to impose strict criminal liability. In
136

Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.01(A)(1).
Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1039.
139
715 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ohio 1999) (emphasis omitted). One should note the Court’s eagerness to
consult previous case law. This tactic seemingly contradicts the Court’s approach in Moody as it goes
beyond the face of the statute in determining whether the General Assembly plainly indicated an
intention to impose strict criminal liability. See Moody, 819 N.E.2d at 269.
140
Former Revised Code section 2913.02(A)(1) provided that: “‘[n]o person, in attempting . . . or in
fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall . . . [h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the
offender’s person or under the offender’s control.’” Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 173.
141
Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 176.
142
Id. at 175. Specifically the Court noted that the mere possession of the weapon “is the potentially
dangerous factual condition warranting the more severe penalty,” the mere presence of the weapon
elevates the risk of harm to the victim justifying the use of strict liability. Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1042
(quoting Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 175).
143
Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1041-42. Recall that the statute at issue in Colon I lacked a mens rea
element as to the “[i]nflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm” element of Revised
Code section 2911.02(A)(2). Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 919-20. The Court dismissed these similarities by
simply stating that “in Colon I there was ‘no dispute’ that the defendant’s indictment for robbery . . . was
defective for failure to allege a mens rea.” Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1043.
137
138
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fact, Justice Lanzinger pointed out this exact conundrum in her concurring
opinion in Lester.
In concurring in the judgment only, Justice Lanzinger flatly
disagreed that the statute at issue “plainly indicated an intention to impose a
standard of strict liability . . . .”144 She noted that the case directly came to
the Court “courtesy of the quagmire created by”145 Colon I and Colon II. In
discussing her disdain for the opinions, she observed that: “Now, every
indictment that does not specify the degree of culpability for each statutory
element is subject to challenge for the first time on appeal. This is a boon to
defendants, a headache to appellate courts, and a nightmare to
prosecutors.”146 Her resolution to the problem was to “call the Colon cases
aberrant.”147 While this may be a step in the right direction, preventing
defendants from challenging a defective indictment for the first time on
appeal, it does nothing to clarify the vague language of Revised Code
section 2901.21(B) and does little to remedy the Court’s conflicting
interpretations of what signifies a “plain indication” to impose strict
liability. The problems presented by Revised Code section 2901.21(B) have
gone unrecognized for far too long and beg a long overdue solution from the
General Assembly.
IV. SOLUTIONS
There are two solutions that will solve inevitable charging
inconsistencies, wasteful allocation of resources, and lack of fair notice to
Ohio citizens. The first is a long-term solution that urges the General
Assembly to amend the vague language contained in section 2901.21(B).
The best solution is for the General Assembly to adopt the default rule
contained in the Model Penal Code (“MPC”). By adopting the MPC default
rule,148 the General Assembly will finally be able to meet their original goal
and purpose of providing a uniform rule that provides fair notice to Ohio
citizens.149
A short-term solution urges the Ohio judiciary to come to a uniform
conclusion on each statute that fails to specify a culpable mental state. By
requiring the judiciary to make a uniform decision as to whether a culpable
mental state is required, county prosecutors’ offices will be able to look to
144

Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1044 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only).
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 1048.
148
The “objective” of section 2.02 is to express the “basic requirement that unless some element of
mental culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no valid criminal
conviction may be obtained.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985). Moreover, section 2.02 rejects the use of strict criminal liability except for a limited class of
offenses that impose “no severer sentence than a fine . . . .” Id.
149
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 38.
145
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the Ohio Jury Instructions to charge individuals consistently. Moreover,
average citizens would have a consistent frame of reference to consult, thus
providing fair notice to the people of Ohio. If the Ohio judiciary cannot or
will not specify their statutory interpretation on these problematic statutes,
prosecutors should err on the side of caution and insert recklessness into
future indictments to avoid the possibility of having a conviction overturned.
A. Long-Term Solution – Amendment of Ohio Revised Code Section
2901.21(B) by the General Assembly
The problems discussed above are a direct consequence of the vague
default rule provided by section 2901.21(B). Thus, the General Assembly
can do away with these problems by amending the vague language and
providing a concrete default rule that provides a clear understanding to
courts, attorneys, and citizens of what constitutes criminal behavior.
Perhaps the best template for the amendment of section 2901.21(B) can be
found in MPC section 2.02(3).150
The MPC default rule states: “When the culpability sufficient to
establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such
element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly
with respect thereto.”151
Thus, the MPC default rule “establishes
recklessness as the default provision of mens rea” because the prosecution
must at the very least establish that the defendant was reckless with regard
to the element.152 Moreover, MPC section 2.02(3) has been defined as
encompassing an “element analysis” structure and as such “provides the
comprehensiveness, clarity, and precision needed to give fair notice and to
limit governmental discretion . . . .”153 The “element analysis” structure of
the MPC allows a “single crime [to] employ different mens rea criteria for
different elements . . . .”154
The MPC requires interpreters to assign a mental state to every
material element155 regardless of whether the statute specifies a culpable
150
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). A majority of state jurisdictions adopted the Model Penal Code
in full or in part. See George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 414
(1981) (“[T]he Model Penal Code has stimulated an extraordinary level of legislative activity. In the last
two decades thirty-four states have adopted at least some portion of the recommendations embodied in
the Model Code. The most popular provisions are those defining the four kinds of culpability . . . .”).
151
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). The drafters of the Model Penal Code wanted to create a
“convenient norm for drafting purposes.” Id. at cmt. 5. Section 2.02(3) assumes that “[w]hen purpose or
knowledge is required” it will be explicitly stated. Id. Moreover, the drafters considered negligence to
be “an exceptional basis of liability, [that] should be excluded as a basis unless explicitly prescribed.” Id.
Thus, this left recklessness as the appropriate default rule in the element analysis scheme.
152
Richard G. Singer & John Q. La Fond, CRIMINAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 81 (4th
ed. 2007).
153
Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 703 (1983).
154
Kenneth W. Simmons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Sections Be Amended?, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (2003).
155
Binder, supra note 108, at 411.
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mental state—this is sometimes termed the “pervasive culpability
requirement.”156
Furthermore, material elements are defined as
encompassing any “conduct, circumstance, or result defining an offense or
defense of justification or excuse.”157 By employing this “pervasive
culpability requirement,” the MPC prohibits the use of “any strict liability
offense that can give rise to imprisonment.”158 Last but not least, the MPC
default rule does not contain the problematic “clear statement rule”159—i.e.,
the language encompassed in section 2901.21(B) allowing strict liability
where the General Assembly plainly intended to impose no culpable mental
state.160
Because the MPC and its default rule have been widely adopted by
other state jurisdictions,161 amending section 2901.21(B) to reflect the MPC
default rule carries heavy precedential value and support. An Ohio court
interpreting the newly amended section 2901.21(B) could draw on other
state interpretations of the default rule for guidance.
As many scholars have noted, the substantive criminal law “protects
the most important societal interests and authorizes the most serious
sanctions the government may impose . . . .”162 Moreover, these sanctions
carry a severe negative stigma, and require that a “criminal code, more than
any other body of law . . . be rational, clear, and internally consistent.”163
By amending section 2901.21(B) to reflect the default rule contained in the
MPC, the General Assembly will be able to avoid problems of judicial
interpretation, inconsistencies among charges, and the lack of fair notice to
citizens that section 2901.21(B) encourages. By alleviating these problems,
the General Assembly will be able to ensure the negative stigma associated
with conviction is suffered only by the truly guilty.
B. Short-Term Solutions—Ohio Jury Instructions and Insertion of
Recklessness into Indictments
In the interim, there are two short-term solutions the Ohio judiciary
and the state may put into action before an amendment by the General
Assembly becomes effective. First, the Ohio judiciary should review the
Revised Code in its entirety and determine which statutes are problematic—
those that fail to specify a culpable mental state and do not have any
156

Id. at 410.
Id. at 408; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9).
158
Binder, supra note 108, at 411.
159
Id.; see also OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (where the statute fails to specify a culpable
mental state, this section provides that recklessness is sufficient culpability unless there is a clear
indication on the part of the General Assembly to impose strict criminal liability).
160
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B).
161
See Fletcher, supra note 150, at 414.
162
Robinson, supra note 153, at 682.
163
Id.
157
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precedent specifying the appropriate mental state.164
Once the judiciary has identified these problematic statutes, they
must come to a cohesive opinion as to the General Assembly’s intent and
165
ultimately determine the appropriate mental state required by the statute.
After the appropriate mental state is determined for a problematic statute,
the judiciary must place the requirement of the mental element into the Ohio
Jury Instructions. By providing a consistent mental element for problematic
statutes in the Ohio Jury Instructions, it provides prosecutors with a
consistent frame of reference for charging individuals. Moreover, it
alleviates the possibility of having a conviction overturned on appeal, as was
the fate of the indictment in the Colon cases.166
Lastly, prosecutors may wish to err on the side of caution by simply
supplying the culpable mental state of recklessness in the indictment of
individuals charged under a problematic statute. By placing recklessness in
the indictment and proving the element at trial, the state can avoid the
possibility of being overturned for a structural error—failing to specify a
167
Even if the court later determines that the culpable
culpable mental state.
mental state of recklessness is not required, the State protects against
reversal by proving a higher culpable mental state than that which is actually
required. As a result, these short-term solutions allow the state and the
courts to apply, with some consistency, the problematic language
maintained in section 2901.21(B).
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Colon I, the
problems associated with section 2901.21(B) have become all too apparent.
The Ohio Supreme Court has constantly applied differing approaches in
determining what “plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal
liability . . . .”168 These inconsistent approaches and the Court’s ruling in
Colon I, that an indictment which fails to charge a mental element
constitutes structural error,169 requires prosecutors to revisit the vagueness
issues subsumed in section 2901.21(B). The Court’s inconsistencies and its
ruling in Colon I taken together lead to three main problems.
164
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.15 (permitting child abuse); 2903.341(B) (patient
endangerment); 2907.24(A) (soliciting after a positive HIV test); 2911.01(A)(3) (aggravated robbery);
2911.02(A)(3) (robbery); 2911.11(A)(1) (aggravated burglary); 2913.51(A) (receiving stolen property);
2919.23(B) (interference with custody); 2919.231 (interfering with action to issue or modify support
order); 2919.24(A)(1)-(3) (contributing to unruliness or delinquency of a child); 2923.162(A)(1)-(3)
(discharge firearm on or near prohibited premises); 2927.27(A)-(B) (illegal bail bond agent practices).
165
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B).
166
Colon II, 893 N.E.2d at 170-71 (finding significant to the structural error analysis the fact that the
judge did not instruct the jury as to the appropriate mental state); see also supra note 118.
167
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 921-22.
168
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B); see supra Part II.D.1-5 and accompanying footnotes.
169
Colon I, 885 N.E.2d at 921.
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First, the vague language of section 2901.21(B) leads to inherent
inconsistencies in charging among prosecutors’ offices throughout the state.
Second, this inconsistency in charging will undoubtedly lead to a lack of fair
notice to Ohio citizens, thus posing serious concerns regarding their due
process rights. Third, prosecutors will undoubtedly spend a considerable
amount of resources researching and litigating whether problematic statutes
should be charged as reckless or strict liability. These resources would most
definitely be better spent advocating for victims of crimes and further
developing programs to prevent or deter criminal behavior.
The General Assembly can avoid these problems by amending the
clear statement rule currently embodied in section 2901.21(B). The best
solution is to adopt the MPC default rule, which encompasses an element
analysis approach and a consistent default to recklessness. Moreover, the
MPC only provides for strict liability in limited circumstances where the
only punishment considered by the statute is the imposition of a fine. By
applying the MPC default rule, the General Assembly will finally be able to
provide a uniform rule that provides fair notice to the citizens of Ohio.
In the meantime, the Ohio judiciary should specify a cohesive
opinion as to statutes that fail to specify a culpable mental state and have no
case law determining what mental state is appropriate under section
2901.21(B). Once determining the appropriate mental state for these
problematic statutes,170 the judiciary must place an appropriate instruction
into the Ohio Jury Instructions. By providing these instructions, the
judiciary can ensure consistency among charging and provide a consistent
frame of reference to Ohio citizens, thus alleviating the problems of fair
notice and due process.
Prosecutors can avoid unwanted legal hassle by simply inserting the
element of recklessness into the indictments of problematic statutes. By
erring on the side of caution, the prosecution can avoid a defendant’s use of
the rationale in Colon I to overturn an otherwise legitimate conviction. Of
course, the overall and best solution is for the General Assembly to correct
the vague language of 2901.21(B), and thus untangle the web of confusion
currently embodied by the default rule of the Ohio Revised Code.

170

See supra note 127.
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